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1. Introduction 
 
Economic inequality has become a prominent topic in public debate after the publication of 
Piketty’s (2014) book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, which provides an overview about the 
global increase in income inequality and wealth concentration over the past 30 years. The last time 
that the topic reached such a prominence was in the 1930s when it was widely accepted that 
inequality was a cause for the Great Depression (Eccles, 1951; Galbraith, 1975). As a response 
policy makers of developed countries increased top marginal income and wealth taxes sharply, 
regulated markets, and strengthened the social welfare system during the middle of the twentieth-
century. The result of these policies, which went hand in hand with the post-war boom, was a sharp 
decline in inequality levels. 
During the 1970s “[s]lower growth, higher inflation and unemployment, and falling profits 
and stock prices created growing discontent with the economic status quo” (Crotty, 2012, p.83). 
This discontent by the ruling elite contributed to a push towards neoliberal policies so that most 
countries deregulated markets, strengthened corporate control and lowered personal and corporate 
taxes, resulting in a decline in labor’s bargaining power and a polarization of income to levels not 
seen since the 1930s (Stiglitz, 2012; Vidal, 2013; Piketty, 2014). The recent rise in income 
inequality and wealth concentration led Piketty (2014) to the conclusion that the introduction of a 
global progressive capital tax is necessary and also was the reason that several Nobel laureates 
economists made a call for more progressive income, estate and consumption taxes (Shiller, 2012; 
Stiglitz, 2012; Solow, 2014). 
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One justification for such redistributional policies could be that the increase in inequality was a 
major contributing factor to the financial crisis of 2007-20091. Such a claim has been made by 
authors like Kumhof et al. (2012), Stiglitz (2012), Behringer and van Treeck (2013), and van 
Treeck (2014), who argue that rising income inequality was a root cause for the rapid growth of 
the US non-prime mortgage market and the global balance of payment imbalances that contributed 
to the Great Recession. Moreover, Lysandrou (2011a; 2011b), Milanovic (2011), Wisman (2013), 
and Goda and Lysandrou (2014) point out that the rise in the absolute concentration of wealth was 
an important contributing factor to the crisis, because the growing demand from very rich 
individuals for investible securities was a major driver behind the growth of the structured credit 
market. 
However, these claims have remained to date a minority view. The debates about the 
financial crisis have mainly focused on the regulation of global financial markets (Kregel, 2008; 
Major, 2012; Thiemann, 2014), central bank policy failures (Taylor, 2008; Golub et al., 2014), 
market failures (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008) and irrational behavior (Akerlof and Shiller, 
2009). The aim of this paper is to analyze if the rise in inequality was a primary cause for the 
malfunctioning of the financial sector. To grasp the complex relationship between inequality and 
financial stability we will provide a framework that takes both sides of the inequality coin, income 
and wealth, equally into account. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper in the 
literature on the crisis that combines these two dimensions of inequality. The paper is also distinct 
in that it analyses the financial crisis in the US as well as the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Both 
                                                          
1 There are other reasons why increasing inequality might be harmful, e.g. rising inequality fosters the influence on political 
decisions which undermines democratic institutions and diverts resources to the wealthiest sectors (Esteban and Ray, 2006; Gilens 
and Page, 2014). 
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crises are interconnected, but often analyzed in isolation. We argue that the Eurozone crisis cannot 
be understood fully without taking into account the preceding events and the rise in inequality. 
The next section shows how the financial crisis began in the market for subprime 
derivatives and morphed into a financial crisis, an economic crisis and, in the Eurozone, in a 
sovereign debt crisis. Sections three and four discuss why the recent crisis is partly result of 
structural problems in the global economy that arose due to increasing inequality. The third section 
clarifies why income inequality was a main ingredient for the emergence of debt-led and export-
led growth models, and an important reason behind the rise of current account imbalances. The 
fourth section illustrates how absolute wealth concentration contributed to these developments and 
argues that increasing wealth holdings at the top were a crucial driver behind the securitization of 
(subprime) loans. The overall findings of the paper are consolidated in section five and, finally, 
section six concludes with policy recommendations. 
 
 
2. From the US subprime crisis to the global financial crisis and the Eurozone 
crisis 
 
On the 9th of August 2007 the French bank BNP Paribas announced the complete evaporation of 
liquidity in the market for certain structured financial securities. The reason for this announcement 
was that the super senior tranches of CDOs, which ought to be safe, started to suffer losses because 
of rapidly rising delinquency and foreclosure rates on US subprime mortgages. The collapse of the 
entire CDO market, in turn, led to uncertainty and panic in the global banking sector because the 
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exact extent of the balance sheet risk exposure of financial institutions was unclear for market 
participants (Acharya et al., 2011; Shin, 2012). 
The subsequent breakdown in trust between large commercial banks (many of whom owned or 
sponsored investment vehicles that were directly exposed to this market segment) set in motion a 
liquidity-solvency crisis spiral, which in September 2008 culminated in the paralysis of the whole 
financial system when the world’s third largest investment bank, Lehman Brothers, declared 
bankruptcy and the insurance company American International Group (AIG) collapsed. The 
following flight to safe securities caused a decline in the government bond yields in OECD 
countries (most notably the US, UK and Germany), and interbank lending literally stopped. The 
freezing of the interbank market meant that banks started to hoard liquidity, with the result that 
most households and firms were no longer able to get access to credit. The result was a global 
recession in 2009. 
The final, on-going, phase of the crisis is the Eurozone crisis that started in 2010. One 
outcome of the financial crisis and the recession was that European governments needed to rescue 
two types of banks: (i) banks that bought the toxic securities that triggered the subprime crisis, and 
(ii) highly leveraged banks that had a maturity mismatch and could not roll-over their debt. Another 
outcome was that government revenues declined while spending increased due to the recession. 
Accordingly, public deficits and public debt increased sharply in nearly all Eurozone countries 
(Figure 1a). During 2008 and 2009 long-term government bond yields of these countries declined 
or stayed roughly stable due to the flight to safety by investors (Figure 1b-c). However, in 2010 
this situation started to change because investors became concerned about the sustainability of 
public finances in the Eurozone, leading to a rise in the refinancing costs for all countries. This 
increase in yields was relatively minor and temporary in those countries that had export-surpluses, 
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whereas Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and to a lesser extent Spain – the so called GIPS countries – 
experienced a longer lasting increase in risk premia (Figure 1b-c). 
[Figure 1] 
 
The GIPS countries have in common that they experienced the build-up of a real estate bubble, 
rapidly increasing private debt levels, and significant current account deficits (ranging from an 
average of -2.1% in the case of Ireland2 to -9.2% in the case of Portugal), which were financed by 
capital inflows from the rest of the world. An outcome of the 2007 crisis was that their real estate 
bubbles burst, which meant that some of their banks went into trouble and unemployment rates 
rose sharply along with a deep recession. Investors therefore increasingly feared that these 
countries would not be able to repay their accumulated debt, which manifested in increasing 
sovereign risk premia.3 The hike in interest rates made a bailout program necessary as the 
refinancing costs for GIPS countries became too high. The accompanying austerity measures that 
were required from the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF –
the so called Troika– were detrimental. They resulted in a decrease in domestic demand that 
contributed to a sharp increase in unemployment, social unrest, a long economic depression 
(Figure 1d), and a further rise in debt to GDP ratios (Figure 1a). 
This experience stands in stark contrast to that of current account surplus countries in the 
Eurozone. Due to their lower (private and public) debt levels and higher competitiveness of their 
                                                          
2 Ireland is different from the other GIPS countries in that the source of its current account deficits were repatriated profits by 
multinational corporations and it had trade surpluses, although these deteriorated in the 2000s. 
3 An important reason for the sharp increase in the yields of Greek government bonds was that prior to the crisis the Greek 
administration misreported budgetary data, which came out when the new government presented a deficit that was more than twice 
as high as expected (Hoque, 2013). Portugal also had persistent deficits prior to the crisis, while Ireland and Spain had budget 
surpluses and very low public debt to GDP ratios in 2007 (25% and 36% respectively) that only increased sharply because of the 
recession and the high costs of their banking bailouts (especially in Ireland). 
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exports, investors were confident that these countries are able to repay their debt more easily. 
Consequently, the demand for their bonds increased again in 2011, driving down their sovereign 
debt costs to historically low levels (Figure 1b). Moreover, this latter group of countries engaged 
in a policy of modest fiscal stimulus when the recession began, which contributed to their quick 
recovery from the 2009 recession, although initially they were hit hard by the recession as a result 
of the sharp decline of their exports. This recovery was only short lived however, with the result 
that in 2013 the growth of all Eurozone countries was either stagnating or negative (Figure 1d). 
This analysis shows that the main cause for the Eurozone crisis was not so much the lack 
of fiscal discipline by some countries, as argued by many mainstream analysts (see e.g. Schuknecht 
et al., 2011; Costa and Ricciuti, 2013), but rather the outcome of the financial crisis and the 
deepening of current account imbalances within the region. Structural flaws of the European 
Monetary Union led to an escalation of the Eurozone crisis. Among these are a lack of instruments 
to cope with inflation rate differentials and financial bubbles, the lack of a coordinated fiscal 
policy, and a central bank that is mainly concerned with inflation targeting and reluctant to act as 
a lender of last resort for member states (Arestis and Sawyer, 2011; Stockhammer, 2011, 2014; 
Sawyer, 2013). The causes of the crisis thus lie in the imbalances that Europe had built up prior to 
the crisis and the reason for deepening of the crisis is related to the policy regime, but the initial 
trigger of the Eurozone crisis was the financial crisis. 
A distinctive feature of the pre-crisis era was an increase in income inequality within 
developed countries (Goda, 2013; Piketty, 2014) as well as a global increase in absolute wealth 
concentration at the top (Goda, 2014). While it is widely acknowledged that distributional issues 
have to figure somewhere in the plot of these events, the question arises if income inequality and 
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wealth concentration was at the very root of the recent crisis. The remainder of this paper intends 
to answer this question. 
 
 
3. Income inequality and debt- and export-led growth 
 
There has been a significant decline in the share of wages in GDP in both the developed and 
developing countries since the 1970s (Onaran and Galanis, 2012; OECD 2012; Stockhammer, 
2013b). Figure 2 shows the adjusted wage share in national income in the developed world.4 The 
share of wages has fallen by 10%-points in the Eurozone, and even more in Japan. In the English 
speaking countries a sharp polarization of personal income distribution and a rise in the 
remuneration of top managers has occurred since the 1980s (Atkinson et al., 2011). As can be seen 
in Figure 3, the share of the top 1% of the income distribution in the US has reached 18.3% of 
GDP in 2007 prior to the crisis exceeding the levels before World War I and the Great Depression; 
the UK followed a similar pattern. Since managerial wages are part of wages, this has led to a more 
modest decline in the wage share in the US and the UK compared to continental Europe. Top 
income shares did not experience the same surge in continental Europe, but in Germany a 
significant low wage segment emerged similar to the US and the UK (Vidal, 2013). 
 
[Figure 2] 
[Figure 3] 
 
                                                          
4 Wages are adjusted labour compensation (real compensation per employee multiplied by total employment). 
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Whether the rise in personal income inequality was caused by a rise in top incomes or the 
generation of a low wage sector, in all the countries, a trend towards greater inequality in personal 
income distribution went along with the fall in the wage share. These developments indicate a clear 
reversal of the trends towards relatively egalitarian income distribution during the post-war era. 
Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa (2007), Dafermos and Papatheodorou (2011), and Wolff and 
Zacharias (2013) show that the rise of personal income inequality is related to changes in the wage 
share. The distribution of personal income depends on the distribution of labor and capital 
endowments, and the way in which aggregate output is shared between the two. If the distribution 
of capital is more unequal than that of labor, a decrease in the labor share would increase personal 
income inequality. 
A fall in the wage share reflects falling unit labor costs, and increasing profitability. 
Mainstream economic policy, informed by neoclassical economics, thus expects the decline in the 
wage share to be associated with stronger growth and employment. However, as can be seen from 
the post-1980s average annual growth rates in GDP (Table 1), this has not been the case, in 
particular with the hindsight of the lost output since the Great Recession. 
[Table 1] 
 
This is a puzzle for mainstream economics, which focuses only on the role of wages as a cost item. 
But Post-Keynesian/Post-Kaleckian models5 suggest that wages have a dual role as a source of 
demand as well. A rise in inequality in the form of a fall in the share of wages will, other things 
                                                          
5 Post-Keynesian economics builds on Keynesian theory of effective demand. It deviates from mainstream Keynesianism in that it 
regards Keynes’ work as break with the neoclassical traditions. In particular Post-Keynesians rejects the need for microfoundations 
and the marginal productivity theory of income distribution. Its monetary theory is based on the concept of fundamental uncertainty 
and highlights the possibility of financial crisis. It often uses class analysis as a foundation of macroeconomic analysis. Bhaduri 
and Marglin (1990) presents a good outline of the Post-Keynesian/Post-Kaleckian models. Lavoie (2009) and King (2002) offer 
introductions to Post-Keynesian theory. 
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equal, suppress domestic consumption since the marginal propensity to consume out of wages is 
higher than that out of profits. 6 However, it may also have a positive effect on investment due to 
increased profitability, and improved international competitiveness might lead to higher net 
exports due to lower unit labor costs. In order to assess the effects of wage moderation it is 
necessary to address the effects on all three components of private demand. If the differentials in 
marginal propensity to consume between wages and profits is relatively large, but the 
responsiveness of investment to profitability and exports and imports to relative price changes are 
low, then the total effect of the increase in the profit share on aggregate demand and hence growth 
would be negative, and the demand regime is called wage-led. If the effect is positive, it is called 
profit-led. The question whether the negative effect of lower wages on consumption or the positive 
effect on investment and net exports is larger is an empirical issue.  
Empirical research that have tried to identify these opposite effects (e.g. Hein and Vogel, 
2008; Stockhammer et al., 2009; Onaran and Galanis, 2012) suggest three important findings: 
Firstly, consumption reacts more sensitively to a decrease in the wage share than does investment, 
hence domestic demand (consumption and investment) is wage-led in all countries. The character 
of the demand and growth regimes thus depends crucially on the relevance of the net export effects. 
Secondly, the effects via the international trade channel depend on the elasticity of exports and 
imports to prices and labor costs as well as the degree of trade openness. Relatively closed large 
economies (like the US and Germany) tend to be wage-led as opposed to relatively small open 
economies, where net exports may play a major role in determining the overall outcome. Thirdly, 
in a large region like the Eurozone or in the current state of high international integration in the 
                                                          
6 The rise in personal income inequality is also expected to have a negative effect on consumption, since the marginal propensity 
to consume out of high income is lower than that out of low income. 
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world economy the international competitiveness effects of declining wage shares are eliminated 
when the fall in the wage share takes place simultaneously across all countries. 
The findings related to the Eurozone are particularly interesting: even when individual 
small countries may be profit-led (e.g. Austria or Netherlands), large countries in the region tend 
to be wage-led (e.g. France and Germany). Furthermore, since wage shares fell simultaneously in 
all countries, there is little advantage of this for the net export position of each country because 
extra-Eurozone trade is comparatively small.7 The result is that domestic effects dominate the 
outcome when all Eurozone countries pursue “beggar thy neighbor” policies, because the 
international competitiveness effects are negligible. A decrease in the wage share in the Eurozone 
as a whole thus leads to lower growth rate (Onaran and Galanis, 2012). 
The expected outcome of the race to the bottom in the wage share in the global economy 
since the 1980s should, therefore, have been a stagnation of global demand and growth. So how 
did the world economy or individual countries managed to grow prior to the Great Recession? A 
stagnation in demand was circumvented by two distinct growth models: (i) a debt-led growth 
model in the US, UK, Australia in the core, and in the periphery in the GIPS and Eastern Europe; 
and (ii) an export-led growth model in Germany, Austria, and Japan in the core. The debt-led and 
the export-led growth models are complementary in that the export-led growth regimes can pursue 
mercantilist models only in the presence of debt-led deficit countries. Hence both rely on 
increasing accumulation of debt, and they are both equally fragile reflecting the global imbalances 
that have grown dramatically in the 2000s; the unsustainability of these global imbalances became 
evident in the aftermath of the Great Recession.  
                                                          
7 Roughly two thirds of the external trade of Euro member states is within the Eurozone. 
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At the root of both models lie different ways to react to the same chronic domestic demand 
deficiency due to declining wage shares. The way different countries dealt with this potential crisis 
of demand depended on their structural parameters regarding their position in the global value 
chains, history of industrial policies, employment relations, and differences in financialization. 
Financial deregulation of the 1980s and the role of the financial industry were strongest in the US 
and the UK. In the periphery of Europe, European integration and the liberalization of capital flows 
was determinant in making debt-led growth feasible.  
International financial deregulation made persistent long-term current account imbalances in the 
debt-led growth regimes feasible without major currency adjustments, which were in return 
financed by capital inflows from the export-led countries with persistent current account surpluses. 
In 2007, for example, Germany had a current account surplus of 7.5% of GDP, while the US had 
a deficit of 5.1%. After the liberalization of capital flows exchange rates were not adjusting to 
trade imbalances but were determined by capital flows chasing financial return. International 
financial liberalization has thus created the conditions for debt-led and export-led growth models 
to co-exist for extended periods as long as the financial investors find the debt situation in the debt-
led growth models sustainable. 
As discussed in Section 2, within the Eurozone itself, the crisis laid bare former divergences 
caused by the process of European Monetary and Economic Unification. Productivity and 
production structures did not converge, and although inflation rates came down in all countries, 
the countries that had low inflation prior to the Euro also had lower inflation rates afterwards. This 
has led to the increasing divergence of nominal unit labor costs (Stockhammer and Onaran, 2012) 
and resulted in sizable current account disequilibria across the Eurozone, which are mostly due to 
imbalances within the Eurozone rather than with countries outside Europe. 
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Hence Southern and Eastern periphery of Europe has experienced massive capital inflows for more 
than a decade from the trade surplus countries, most of all Germany. As a result, massive external 
liabilities have been accumulated in the trade deficit countries, which financed debt-led spending. 
In Greece it was mostly the government sector that accumulated debt, in Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain it was rather the private sector, and in particular the household sector (Lapavitsas et al., 
2010) – between 2000 and 2008 private household debt increased by  
26%-points in the US, 28%-points in the UK, and 61.7, 21.3 and 32.5%-points in Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain respectively, whereas it shrank in Germany by 11.3%-points (Stockhammer, 2013a). 
In the debt-led countries, growth driven by increasing debt, financed by capital inflows led 
to asset and/or property price bubbles, which fuelled the increase in debt via equity withdrawals. 
In the export-led countries, on the contrary, net exports have provided the main driving force for 
demand. In the extreme case of Germany, three quarters of GDP growth has been driven by net 
exports since 2000 (Stockhammer and Onaran, 2012). 
How far does our argument differ from the existing literature? To begin with, most 
mainstream economics regards the crisis foremost as a financial issue (e.g. Blanchard, 2009; 
Brunnermeier, 2009; Roubini and Mihm, 2010), while distributional considerations are often 
disregarded. There are some exceptions though. Rajan (2010) contends that skill-biased 
technological change increased permanent inequality in the US, and, induced the US government 
to encourage credit growth in general and the subprime mortgage market in specific to expand 
consumption. Stiglitz (2009; 2011; 2012) also argues that aggregate demand would have been 
insufficient without a rise in private debt levels that “fuelled a consumption boom that allowed 
Americans to live beyond their means” (Stiglitz, 2012, p.54). In contrast to Rajan, for Stiglitz the 
main reasons for this situation were that poor and middle-income households tried to keep up with 
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the richer parts of the society, and that rent seeking and asymmetric information led to market 
distortions.  
Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model with investors and workers, in which an increase in inequality results in rising debt of 
workers that is financed from savings from investors. As workers become over-indebted, the 
number of defaults increases, and, finally, a financial crisis emerges. A shortcoming of this model 
is that it does not involve asset and property price bubbles and that lending is solely driven by 
savings. In none of these mainstream contributions the emergence of different growth regimes and 
of a role of inequality in contributing to balance of payment imbalances are central. The only 
exception is Kumhof et al. (2012), who extend the Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) model to a two 
country case where the rich population in countries with less developed financial markets finances 
the rising debt of the poor population in countries with more developed financial markets. 
However, this paper does not focus on the existing imbalances within the Eurozone, and it does 
not explain why countries with highly developed financial markets (like Germany) also have 
financed the poor population in other countries. 
Among Post-Keynesian and Marxian economists the issue of income distribution has 
featured more prominently and several authors have offered analyses that substantially overlap 
with ours (e.g. Barba and Pivetti, 2009; Foster and Magdoff, 2009; Horn and van Treeck, 2011; 
Palley, 2012; van Treeck and Sturn, 2012; Behringer and van Treeck, 2013; Cynamon and Fazzari, 
2013; van Treeck, 2014).8 In contrast to our analysis, most of the Marxist literature concentrates 
on overproduction – a surplus of capital with a lack of investment opportunities –, rarely 
                                                          
8 The importance of inequality is contested among heterodox economists. Some Marxists regard a declining profit rate as the prime 
cause underlying the crisis (see e.g. Freeman, 2010; Kliman, 2012), although Dumenil and Levy (2011) and Basu and Vasudevan 
(2013) report that profit rates recovered in the neoliberal period. Many Post-Keynesians concentrate on financial regulation and/or 
Minskian instability to explain the financial crisis (see e.g. Kregel, 2008; Crotty, 2009; Wray, 2009). 
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distinguishes between different growth regimes and mainly focuses on US developments. 
Exceptions are Brenner (2009), Dumenil and Levy (2011), Lim and Khor (2011) and Vidal (2013) 
who discuss international imbalances and the importance of debt-led growth. Nevertheless the 
imbalances within the Eurozone are not discussed in relation to inequality.9 This is also true for 
the above listed Post-Keynesian studies. 
We regard the two studies by Hein (2012) and Hein and Mundt (2012) closest to ours. Both identify 
rising inequality, rising household debt, global imbalances, and financial deregulation as the main 
causes of the financial and Eurozone crisis; and they distinguish between debt-led and export-led 
regimes. Their analysis is also based on a Kaleckian approach. However, the center of their 
analysis is the effects of financialization rather than income distribution and they do not discuss 
wealth distribution in much depth, to which we turn in the next section. 
 
 
4. Wealth concentration, demand for assets and asset prices  
 
Prior to the current crisis, not only functional and personal income inequality but also the extent 
of wealth accumulation at the top increased dramatically. Wealth concentration can be measured 
in relative and absolute terms. Relative wealth concentration refers to the possession of 
disproportionate shares of wealth at the top. It is well documented that relative wealth 
concentration is normally higher than relative income concentration, and that the trend changes in 
top wealth shares (Figure 4) have been to some extent similar to that of top income shares (Figure 
                                                          
9 Lapavitsas et al. (2010) emphasize the structural contradictions of the Euro as a single currency to explain the imbalances; their 
focus is not on inequality as a root cause of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. 
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3). After World War I the extreme top wealth shares in Europe and the US decreased significantly, 
while they started to increase again from the late 1970s onwards.10 There exists very little data for 
countries from other regions but estimates suggest that within inequality has increased in most 
countries during the 2000s and that the global top 1% share currently is around 46% of total global 
wealth (Goda, 2014). 
[Figure 4] 
 
In order to analyze the effect of wealth concentration on financial investment demand, it is 
important to consider changes in the absolute amount of global wealth holdings on the top of the 
wealth distribution. The amount of absolute wealth holdings is important insofar as they determine 
how much financial investment demand the wealthy people have, and the global pool rather than 
wealth in a single country in isolation is the relevant indicator as financial capital is highly mobile. 
Unfortunately, “official publications do not report estimates of absolute inequality” (Atkinson and 
Brandolini, 2010, p.3). However, some private wealth reports provide estimates of the amount of 
global wealth holdings of those individuals who have a net worth of at least US$1 million (primary 
residency excluded) – so called high net worth individuals (HNWIs). 
According to these reports, between 1986 and 2012 HNWIs’ wealth increased 6.6-fold – 
from US$ 7.2 trillion to US$ 46.2 trillion – and billionaires’ wealth even more than 15-fold (Goda, 
2014).11 The increase in absolute wealth concentration was especially steep in the years prior to 
the crisis. HNWIs’ net wealth increased more than 1.5-fold between 2002 and 2007, from US$26.7 
                                                          
10 The data presented in Figure 3 is mainly based on estate tax data. Some data sources that are based on household survey data 
suggest that the increase of top income shares was not as pronounced as that presented in Figure 3 (see e.g. Wolff, 2010 for the 
US). It is likely that much of this discrepancy can be explained by top-coding, sampling errors, non-responses, and misreporting 
(Vermeulen, 2014). 
11 During the same period global GDP only increased 4.8-fold in current terms. 
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to US$41 trillion12, while the global wealth holdings of billionaires increased 2.3-fold to US$3.5 
trillion. This growth can be explained partly by the growth of the HNWI population (from 7.3 
million to 10.1 million individuals) and partly by the increase of the mean wealth per HNWI (from 
US$3.66 million to US$4.03 million). The tremendous growth in wealth holdings at the top means 
that Rockefeller today would not be within the top 20 of the global billionaires list and that at the 
end of 2012 the four wealthiest men –Slim, Gates, Ortega, and Buffet– were more than twice as 
rich as Rockefeller was in 1937 (Goda, 2014). 
One reason for this increase of absolute wealth holdings of HNWIs was an increase in top 
incomes (Saez and Zucman, 2014). Personal income inequality and wealth concentration tend to 
be self-reinforcing because high income households save a higher proportion of their income and 
“wealth has a substantial impact on the share of income earned by those in the top 0.5 percent of 
the [adjusted gross income] distribution” (Tuttle and Gauger, 2006, p.506). Another reason for this 
exceptional increase in wealth concentration was the sharp increase of global stock market prices 
and real estate values, since increasing asset prices automatically translate into higher wealth 
holdings of their owners, who mainly belong to the richest segment of the population (Wolff, 
2010).  
In contrast to income inequality, few studies discuss possible economic effects of the 
increase in absolute wealth accumulation at the top. Froud et al. (2001) argue that household 
savings from the richer parts of the US and UK society are increasingly invested in existing 
financial securities rather than the real sector. The result is that companies cannot generate enough 
returns to satisfy investors’ profit expectations. This ‘symptom of low returns’ forces companies 
(i) to divert their activities into areas with higher returns, and (ii) to boost their share prices, both 
                                                          
12 Different definitions and estimates of HNWIs’ wealth holdings exist (see Goda (2014) for an in-depth discussion). The figures 
presented in the text are lower bound estimates of HNWIs’ wealth. 
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of which lead to a ‘coupon type of capitalism’ in which the financial sector becomes more and 
more important and stock market bubbles are building-up. Similarly, Wisman and Baker (2012) 
and Wisman (2013, p.922) claim that by “seeking profitable outlets for its dramatically increased 
income and wealth, the elite fuelled first a stock market boom and then, after the high-tech bubble 
burst, a real-estate boom” in the US. Between 1997 and 2007 increasing global wealth holdings 
went hand in hand with a sharp increase in stock market and housing prices in the US and the 
Eurozone. An indication that the former was driving the latter is that global wealth holdings were 
increasing continuously and to a stronger degree than the asset prices in the US and Eurozone 
(Figure 5). The resulting price rally in stock and real estate markets, in turn, contributed to the 
existence of the above discussed debt-led growth regime in the US, the UK and GIPS countries13 
as they provided greater collateral to low- and middle-income households, which enabled them to 
accumulate increasing debt. 
[Figure 5] 
 
Political economists also have acknowledged that the toxic securities that triggered the crisis were 
partly created because “there is a growing ‘wall of money’ facing global financial markets that is 
looking for investment opportunities” (Engelen et al., 2010, p. 47), which means that the crisis “is 
also a story of the financialization of consumer credit networks [that enabled] lenders of all kinds 
to generate new assets” (Langley, 2008, pp. 136-137). However, in these discussions wealth 
concentration normally is not mentioned but instead emphasis is laid on rising asset demand from 
                                                          
13 Between 1997 and 2007, stock market prices increased by 320% in Greece, 280% in Spain, 220% in Portugal and 190% in 
Ireland, while house prices rose by 350% in Ireland, 300% in Spain, and 250% in Greece. 
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institutional investors, governments and sovereign wealth funds. This is clearly a shortcoming, 
given the above discussed increase in wealth concentration at the top and the fact that in 2007 
HNWIs had more asset under management (US$41 trillion) than global pension funds (US$28 
trillion), mutual funds (US$26 trillion) and insurance companies (US$20 trillion) (IFSL, 2008). 
Two authors that have addressed this shortcoming are Milanovic (2011) and Wisman (2013), 
although in a different manner. Milanovic states that “[h]igh-net-worth individuals and the 
financial sector were … keen to find new lending opportunities” (p.195) to overcome a shortage 
of investment opportunities, while Wisman (2013, p.940) argues that “investment funds were 
being switched from production to speculation, which stimulated innovations in credit 
instruments”. However, both authors do not specify a concrete transmission mechanism. 
Lysandrou (2011a; 2011b) is the first author to theorize the link between the increase in absolute 
wealth concentration and CDO production in more detail. His argument is that the increasing 
financial investment demand from HNWIs contributed to a global shortage of investible securities. 
To alleviate this shortage the market for CDOs was rapidly expanded. Lysandrou does not provide 
empirical evidence for his claim though. To give credibility to this theory it needs to be shown that 
(i) one driving force behind the mortgage securitization growth was a fall in the yield of traditional 
debt securities, (ii) HNWIs contributed to this fall, and (iii) these individuals also created a demand 
pressure for CDOs. 
Evidence regarding the first point has been provided by Caballero et al. (2009), Bernanke 
(2011), and Goda et al. (2013). Especially after 2000 many emerging market economies (EMEs) 
were experiencing high growth rates, but their debt security market could not keep up with this 
development. EMEs’ bond markets stayed ‘underdeveloped;’ at the end of 2007 the EMEs’ share 
in global GDP was one-third whereas their share in world debt security markets was only ten 
21 
percent (IMF, 2008). Due to this global mismatch investors were increasingly ‘forced’ to invest in 
the US where most financial assets are produced (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008). The 
resulting capital inflows not only helped to finance the debt-led growth model of the US, but also 
led to the phenomena that the supply of traditional investment grade debt securities could not keep 
up with the growing global demand for these securities. Government purchases from export 
surplus countries like China lowered long term yields of US Treasury and agency bonds, while 
foreign and domestic private investor demand reduced US agency, corporate, and municipal bonds 
yields (Bernanke, 2011; Bertaut et al., 2012; Goda et al., 2013). The depressed yields, in turn, led 
to a search for alternative debt securities with a higher yield. Various studies have therefore 
concluded that “an excess safe asset demand on the part of investors was a chief force that drove 
the expansion of the US CDO market well beyond what was prudent” (Goda et al., p.135). 
But, in how far were HNWIs involved in this global excess demand? To answer this 
question, Goda and Lysandrou (2014) estimates the size of HNWIs’ US bonds holdings and their 
involvement in the demand pressure. According to their findings, more than half of HNWIs wealth 
is comprised of financial securities of which around half is comprised of debt securities. Moreover, 
HNWIs bond holdings are heavily skewed towards the US market which is by far the biggest and 
most liquid market in the world. The rise in HNWIs wealth holdings thus meant that global HNWIs 
increased their total holdings of US bonds by around forty percent between mid-2004 (US$2.1 
trillion) and mid-2007 (US$2.9 trillion).14 This increase was restricted to US agency, corporate 
and municipal bonds, whereas their US Treasury holdings declined slightly. This pattern can be 
explained by the fact that private investors were squeezed out of the latter market due to the steeply 
                                                          
14 Goda and Lysandrou (2014) estimate that around 60% of US individual bond holdings were held by US HNWIs prior to the 
crisis, while 20% to 30% of foreign private bond holdings stemmed from rest of the world HNWIs. Different estimates by Hager 
(2014) confirm that US bond holdings are concentrated in the hands of the top 1% of the population. 
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increasing demand for Treasuries from foreign governments (especially from China). The rise in 
HNWIs non-Treasury bond holdings meant that very rich individuals depressed long-term bond 
yields of AAA-rated US agency, corporate and municipal bonds “to a similar degree as changes 
in business cycle expectations, interest rate volatility and default risk” (Goda and Lysandrou, 2014, 
p.13). This result suggests that HNWIs significantly contributed to the above mentioned shortage 
of traditional debt securities, which triggered a ‘search for yield’ by all global investors that helped 
to encourage the demand for CDOs. 
As regards the third point it has to be shown that HNWIs also were involved in the demand 
pressure for CDOs. Rich investors were not directly involved in this market, but indirectly via 
hedge funds, who held nearly half of all issued CDOs by June 2007 (Blundell-Wignall, 2007). The 
absence of rich individuals’ direct involvement most likely can be explained by the complex nature 
of CDOs15, whereas the dominant position of hedge funds can be mainly explained by two factors: 
(i) the exceptional growth of this industry16, and (ii) the pressure that they faced to generate above 
average yields by the investors whose funds were managed by the hedge funds. An important 
driver behind this growth and pressure was the increasing investment of HNWIs, who increased 
their hedge fund assets approximately from US$500 billion to US$1,1 trillion between 2002 and 
2007 (Goda and Lysandrou, 2014). 
Hedge fund managers were contented with their growing asset base, but it also provided 
them with a problem. To maximize returns hedge funds rely on leverage, and to get access to cheap 
                                                          
15 An owner of ordinary government and debt securities can easily find out how risky the investment is and in how far the risk of 
default changes over time. The same is true for asset-backed security (ABS) investors as the backing collateral normally also 
consists of a single, homogenous class of assets. CDOs, by contrast, do not meet this transparency criterion as they are backed by 
many different types of asset classes (in their simplest form a CDO is an ABS of many ABS). That is why each CDO’s price is 
negotiated over the counter by the seller and the buyer, i.e. in contrast to conventional fixed income securities, CDOs have no 
standard prices. As a result, “wealthy individuals did not have the requisite expertise to participate [directly] in this market” 
(Lysandrou, 2011-12, p.227). 
16 Hedge funds’ assets under management more than tripled between 2002 and 2007, reaching US$2.2 trillion in 2007.  
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credits they need to provide investment grade collateral to banks. Given that investment grade 
bonds had historical low yields, hedge funds needed to find an alternative that was accepted by 
banks and at the same time kept borrowing costs to a minimum. CDOs were the solution to this 
problem. Their senior tranches could be used as collateral that gave a decent return, while their 
equity tranches were seen as high yielding investment opportunity whose risk could be controlled 
by using put options and credit default swaps17. This strategy allowed hedge funds to generate an 
above average return for their clients and high bonus payments for themselves, and at the same 
time generated demand for banks to supply increasing amounts of CDOs. This analysis suggests 
that the historical high level of absolute wealth concentration is crucial to explain why the CDO 
market reached a size that was sufficiently large to endanger the global financial system when it 
collapsed in August 2007.  
 
 
5. Synthesis 
 
Rising income inequality and wealth concentration have contributed to the crisis in complex but 
essential ways. Figure 6 summarizes our argument. Rising income inequality has led to potentially 
stagnant demand, because the world economy overall is in a wage-led demand regime. In 
Neoliberalism this has been overcome via either debt-led or export-led growth models. The debt-
led growth model relied on asset and property bubbles to generate credit that ultimately fuelled 
consumption. This allowed working class households to maintain growing consumption while 
                                                          
17 Put options enabled hedge funds to sell an equity tranche at a specified date at a specified price. Credit default swaps gave hedge 
funds the right to be compensated in the case of default. 
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their incomes stagnated (in particular in the US and the UK). These countries usually had large 
current account deficits and effectively played the role of a growth engine of the world economy. 
The export-led growth model had stagnant domestic demand and used net export growth as the 
source of demand growth. Both growth models are intrinsically unstable, since they both rely on 
increasing debt to income ratios. In the debt-led model household debt has risen to allow for 
growth. However, the export-led growth model also relies on rising debt, but it is not domestic 
debt, but rising foreign debt of its trade partners. The debt-led and export-led growth models are 
thus complementary and they result in rising household debt, international imbalances and rising 
international debt. 
[Figure 6] 
 
Rising wealth concentration played an important role in providing the finance for these unstable 
growth regimes. Rich households (or their trusts) save differently from working class households: 
they save a higher share of their income and hold riskier assets. The superrich, or more technically, 
HNWIs, played a crucial role in that (i) their increasing asset demand helped to lower the yield of 
traditional bond classes, which put pressure on investors to seek alternative investment grade fixed 
income securities that provided higher yields, and (ii) HNWIs were the main investors in hedge 
funds18, which, in turn, were the main buyers of CDOs. HNWIs thus helped to create the 
institutions that aggressively developed new financial instruments and, ultimately, they provided 
the funding for subprime loans and growing credit more broadly. Economic inequality thus played 
                                                          
18 HNWIs remained the main investor in hedge funds throughout the whole pre-crisis period despite the increasing involvement of 
institutional investors in this market (Lysandrou, 2011b). 
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a crucial role on both the supply and demand sides of the market of the toxic securities that were 
at the epicenter of the crisis. 
Overall, many elements of our argument can be found in the literature. In particular the 
link between income inequality and rising household debt has become widely accepted among 
many Post-Keynesians and Marxians and is also discussed at the critical fringes of the mainstream 
(as discussed in Section 3). The emergence of debt-led versus export-led growth regimes and the 
impact of wealth concentration on financial (in)stability are much less widely recognized though, 
and most of the literature focuses on the US. Our approach differs in various ways. Firstly, our 
internationally comparative analysis exposes that countries have relied on debt- or export-led 
growth models in order to deal with the rise in inequality. Secondly, we systematically highlight 
the link between inequality and demand formation in the real and the financial sector. To our best 
knowledge our study is the first that that integrates the analysis of income inequality and wealth 
concentration and its effects on consumption and debt levels, balance of payment imbalances, and 
financial innovation. Finally, our paper is the first that discusses in detail the link between debt- 
and export-led growth regimes, wealth concentration, and the Eurozone crisis. 
Several topics for future research emerge: First, the interaction between the different growth 
regimes needs further analysis. In particular the contribution of capital inflows to asset and 
property price bubbles in advanced economies is under-researched. Second, the effect of inequality 
on the growing demand for financial innovation, speculation and fragility deserves a lot more 
attention than it has hitherto received. Third, there is need to develop macroeconomic models that 
explicitly deal with the link between income distribution, asset prices and wealth distribution. 
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6. Policy recommendations 
 
An important policy implication arising out of this analysis is that a more egalitarian distribution 
of income is not a luxury that can be taken care of once the crisis and regulatory issues have been 
resolved, but that it is necessary to reverse the actual level of absolute wealth concentration and 
income inequality to help contain the inherent problems of the current mode of capitalism. Given 
that income inequality and absolute wealth concentration have increased further since the outbreak 
of the crisis (OECD, 2013; Goda, 2014), decisive government intervention seems necessary to 
achieve this aim.   
The policy mix requires both the restoration of the link between productivity and real wage 
growth and progressive taxes and social policies. Hence minimum wages should increase 
automatically in line with inflation and productivity and the bargaining power of workers should 
be strengthened through changes in the union legislation and collective bargaining coverage as 
well as strengthening the welfare state and taming the mobility of capital and regulating finance.  
With regard to taxes, we agree with Piketty (2014) that a wealth tax is needed. Additionally, 
top marginal income and estate taxes should be raised. An indexation of these taxes would be an 
appropriate solution to avoid very high concentrations of income and wealth. One possible rule 
would be to link top income and wealth taxes to median incomes and wealth holdings. Possible 
thresholds for developed countries could be a highest marginal tax rate of 70% for income above 
10 times the median income, of 10% on all personal net wealth (excluding primary residence) that 
is above 100 times the median wealth, and of 90% for all inheritance that are above 100 times the 
median wealth.  
27 
This proposal might seem very radical at first sight, but it is not. In the four decades before 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan came to power the UK and the US had top marginal income 
tax rates of at least 70% and wealth taxes were common in OECD countries. As existing 
governance arrangements allow the rich to be highly mobile and secretive, these policies need to 
be implemented on a global or at least regional scale. Moreover, tax avoidance and evasion 
opportunities have to be closed off through the implementation of tougher regulations. The 
accruing new government revenues should be used for public services like education, health, care 
services for children and elderly, the reduction of value added taxes for non-luxury goods, and for 
green investment programs. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Development of debt, growth and bond yields in the Eurozone, 2007-2013 
 
Note: The export surplus countries1 are Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium and Finland (sources: IMF, WEO, 
IMF, IFS). 
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Figure 2: Wage shares in Western countries, 1960-2013 
 
Note: Adjusted, ratio to GDP at factor cost (source: AMECO). 
Figure 3: Top 1% income shares in Western countries, 1886-2012 
 
Note: There is a break in the UK series in 1990 (source: World Top Incomes Database). 
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Figure 4: Top 1% wealth shares in Western countries, 1910-2010 
 
Note: Estimates of inequality of net worth between living adults (source: Piketty (2014)). 
Figure 5: HNWIs’ net wealth and asset prices, Index (1997 = 100) 
 
Note: Own calculations based on data from Capgemini & Merrill Lynch, Dallas Fed; OECD, ECB. 
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Figure 6: Income inequality and wealth concentration as contributing factors of the crisis 
 
 
 
Table 1: Average growth of real GDP in Western countries 
 
Source: AMECO 
 
 
1961-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 2008-13
Eurozone (12 countries) 5.3 3.8 2.3 2.1 2.2 -0.3
United Kingdom 2.9 2.4 2.5 2.2 3.2 -0.3
United States 4.7 3.2 3.1 3.3 2.7 0.9
Japan 10.1 5.2 4.4 1.5 1.5 0.3
